DMARC Record Checker, RFC 7489 Auditor & Policy Generator

Query live _dmarc DNS TXT records, inspect tag-by-tag RFC 7489 compliance, audit SPF and DKIM identifier alignment (adkim / aspf), verify external RUA reporting authorization, and generate custom anti-spoofing DMARC records.

Quick Live Presets:
A+
Anti-Spoofing Grade
DNS Host Record _dmarc.google.com
Enforcement Policy (p=) reject (100%)
Root SPF (v=spf1) Status v=spf1 include:_spf.google.com ~all
Mail Exchangers (MX) smtp.google.com (10)
Published DMARC TXT Record
v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:[email protected]

🔬 Tag-by-Tag RFC 7489 Syntax & Alignment Breakdown

Tag Configured Value Status RFC 7489 Interpretation & Security Impact
v= DMARC1 OK DMARC Protocol Version (RFC 7489 Section 6.3). Must be DMARC1.
p= reject OK Strict SMTP rejection of spoofed emails.
sp= reject (inherited) OK Subdomain policy override. Prevents attackers from spoofing nonexistent subdomains.
adkim= r (Relaxed) OK Allows organizational root domain match for DKIM signatures.
aspf= r (Relaxed) OK Allows organizational root domain match for SPF Return-Path.
pct= 100% OK Percentage of unauthorized messages subjected to the DMARC policy.
rua= mailto:[email protected] OK Destination URIs for daily XML aggregate authentication telemetry.
ruf= Not configured OK Destination URIs for per-message forensic failure reports (AFRF).
fo= 0 (default) OK Failure reporting trigger condition (0 = all mechanisms fail, 1 = any fails).
ri= 86400 s OK Requested aggregate reporting interval in seconds (86400 = 24 hours).

📋 Security Audit Findings, Warnings & RUA Authorization

  • ✅ The domain requests recipients to reject mail that fails authentication.

🛠️ Interactive DMARC Record Generator & Policy Builder

Generated DNS TXT Record for _dmarc (_dmarc.example.com):
v=DMARC1; p=reject; sp=reject; adkim=s; aspf=s; rua=mailto:[email protected]

📊 RFC 7489 DMARC Tag Reference & Identifier Alignment Matrix

DMARC Tag Required? Default Value Valid Values / Syntax Technical Function in Email Authentication
v= Yes (1st) None DMARC1 Protocol version identifier; MUST be the very first tag in the TXT record.
p= Yes None none | quarantine | reject Action for messages failing DMARC alignment: none (monitor only), quarantine (spam folder), or reject (block at SMTP).
sp= Optional Inherits p= none | quarantine | reject Override policy specifically for all subdomains; inherits p= if omitted.
adkim= Optional r (Relaxed) r | s Compares RFC5322.From domain against DKIM d= signing domain (r = organizational root match, s = exact match).
aspf= Optional r (Relaxed) r | s Compares RFC5322.From domain against SPF RFC5321.MailFrom / Return-Path domain (r = relaxed, s = strict).
rua= Recommended None mailto:user@domain!10m Comma-separated mailto: URIs where receivers send daily gzipped XML aggregate authentication reports.
ruf= Optional None mailto:sec@domain Comma-separated mailto: URIs for real-time AFRF forensic copies of individual failing messages.
pct= Optional 100 0 – 100 Percentage (0–100) of failing email stream subjected to the p= enforcement action during rollout.
fo= Optional 0 0 | 1 | d | s Forensic trigger: 0 (both SPF & DKIM fail), 1 (either fails), d (DKIM fails), s (SPF fails).
ri= Optional 86400 Positive integer (seconds) Requested interval in seconds between aggregate XML reports (86400 s = 24 hours).

What This Tool Does

This DMARC record checker and generator queries live _dmarc DNS TXT records or parses pasted raw v=DMARC1 strings to validate RFC 7489 syntax and identifier alignment. Enter a public domain name, paste a raw DMARC policy, or select one of the preset test targets (such as google.com, paypal.com, cloudflare.com, github.com, or a weak p=none policy) to run an immediate audit. Alongside the _dmarc record, the tool queries the domain's root v=spf1 TXT record, retrieves up to four primary Mail Exchanger (MX) hosts, and performs live cross-domain DNS verification (<domain>._report._dmarc.<external-host>) for any external aggregate (rua) or forensic (ruf) reporting addresses.

The audit output assigns a security grade from A+ to F, displays a tag-by-tag breakdown table (v, p, sp, adkim, aspf, pct, rua, ruf, fo, and ri) with status badges (OK, WARN, ERR), and lists specific RFC 7489 syntax errors or configuration warnings. Below the auditor, an interactive DMARC Policy Builder lets you configure main and subdomain policies, strict or relaxed DKIM/SPF alignment, rollout percentage (1% to 100%), and reporting URIs to generate and copy a ready-to-publish DNS TXT record.

Email Authentication Engineering: RFC 7489 DMARC Policies, Identifier Alignment, and Anti-Spoofing Architecture

When an email arrives in a recipient's inbox, the Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP, RFC 5321) provides zero built-in verification of the sender's identity. Just as anyone can write any return address on a paper envelope, any server on the internet can transmit an email claiming to originate from [email protected]. While SPF (Sender Policy Framework, RFC 7208) and DKIM (DomainKeys Identified Mail, RFC 6376) were created to authenticate sending servers and cryptographic signatures, neither protocol protects the address the human recipient actually sees in their email client: the RFC 5322 `From:` header.

DMARC (Domain-based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance, RFC 7489) bridges this critical security gap. Our DMARC Record Checker & Policy Builder resolves your domain's `_dmarc` DNS TXT record in real time, evaluates root SPF and MX records, validates external aggregate reporting (`_report._dmarc`) authorization, and grades your anti-spoofing posture from `A+` to `F`.

1. How DMARC Identifier Alignment Works (`adkim` and `aspf`)

An email can pass both SPF and DKIM checks and still be a dangerous phishing spoof! Consider an attacker who registers `evil-mailer.net`, sets up valid SPF and DKIM records for `evil-mailer.net`, and sends an email where the SMTP envelope `Return-Path` is `[email protected]`, the DKIM `d=` signature is `evil-mailer.net`, but the visible header shown to the victim is `From: Billing <[email protected]>`. Without DMARC, receiving mail servers see `SPF=PASS` and `DKIM=PASS` (for `evil-mailer.net`) and deliver the forged email.

DMARC defeats this attack through Identifier Alignment, which requires that the authenticated SPF domain or DKIM signing domain match the visible `RFC5322.From` organizational domain:

  • Relaxed Alignment (`adkim=r` / `aspf=r`, Default): The organizational root domain of the `RFC5322.From` header must match the organizational domain of the DKIM `d=` tag or SPF `MailFrom` domain. For example, if the visible sender is `[email protected]`, an SPF Return-Path of `[email protected]` passes relaxed alignment because both share the organizational root `example.com`.
  • Strict Alignment (`adkim=s` / `aspf=s`): Requires an exact, character-for-character Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN) match. If `From:` is `[email protected]`, a DKIM signature with `d=sub.example.com` will fail strict alignment.

2. The Three DMARC Enforcement Policies: `none`, `quarantine`, and `reject`

Every DMARC record must declare a primary policy tag (`p=`) immediately following `v=DMARC1;` (and optionally a subdomain policy tag `sp=`):

  1. Monitoring Mode (`p=none`): Instructs receiving mail providers (Gmail, Microsoft 365, Yahoo) to take no enforcement action when an email fails DMARC alignment, delivering spoofed messages normally while sending daily XML aggregate reports to the address specified in `rua=`. Warning: `p=none` provides zero active protection against phishing and should only be used temporarily during initial deployment.
  2. Quarantine Mode (`p=quarantine`): Instructs receivers to treat unaligned messages as suspicious and route them directly to the recipient's Spam or Junk folder rather than the primary inbox.
  3. Reject Mode (`p=reject`): The gold standard of email security. Receivers block unauthorized emails outright during the SMTP transaction (`550 5.7.1 Unauthenticated email is not accepted`), preventing spoofed messages from ever reaching users.

3. Aggregate (`rua`) vs. Forensic (`ruf`) Reporting & External DNS Authorization

When you configure `rua=mailto:[email protected]`, participating mail servers send daily gzipped XML reports detailing every IP address that attempted to send mail as your domain, alongside its SPF and DKIM pass/fail results. However, if you send reports to an external domain (for example, `domain-a.com` specifies `rua=mailto:[email protected]`), RFC 7489 Section 7.1 mandates an external DNS verification check to prevent attackers from flooding third-party inboxes with report spam.

Specifically, the receiving mail server queries the TXT record at:

domain-a.com._report._dmarc.dmarc-vendor.net

Unless `dmarc-vendor.net` publishes a `v=DMARC1` TXT record at that exact subdomain, receivers will silently drop your aggregate reports. Our auditor automatically performs this cross-domain DNS verification for every external `rua` and `ruf` URI in your policy.

4. Safe DMARC Deployment Roadmap: From `pct=10` to BIMI Readiness

Jumping straight to `p=reject` on a complex corporate domain can accidentally block legitimate third-party mail streams (such as CRM platforms, ticketing desks, or payroll providers). Follow a phased rollout: start with `v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:[email protected]`, inspect XML aggregate reports for 14 days to authorize all legitimate senders via SPF/DKIM, transition to `p=quarantine; pct=25`, increase `pct` to `100`, and finally lock down the domain with `p=reject; sp=reject;`. Note that an enforced policy (`p=quarantine; pct=100` or `p=reject`) is a mandatory prerequisite for BIMI (Brand Indicators for Message Identification) to display your verified brand logo in Gmail and Apple Mail.

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) — DMARC Record Checker

Why does my domain get a "D" grade when it has a valid v=DMARC1 record?

A grade of "D" means your DMARC syntax is valid, but your policy is set to p=none. In p=none (monitoring) mode, receiving email servers do not block or quarantine spoofed emails pretending to come from your domain. To achieve an A or A+ grade, upgrade your policy to p=reject.

Can a domain have multiple DMARC TXT records at _dmarc.domain.com?

No! According to RFC 7489 Section 6.6.3, if a DNS query for _dmarc.<domain> returns more than one TXT record starting with v=DMARC1, receivers must abandon DMARC processing altogether, leaving your domain completely unprotected. Always merge settings into a single TXT record.

Do both SPF and DKIM need to pass for an email to pass DMARC?

No. DMARC uses a logical OR condition: an email passes DMARC if EITHER SPF passes with identifier alignment OR DKIM passes with identifier alignment. However, configuring both SPF and DKIM is strongly recommended because email forwarding breaks SPF while preserving DKIM signatures.

What is the difference between p= and sp= in a DMARC record?

The p= tag defines the enforcement policy for your main organizational domain (e.g., example.com), while sp= defines the policy specifically for all subdomains (e.g., mail.example.com or nonexistent random subdomains). Setting sp=reject prevents attackers from spoofing fake subdomains even while you test p=none on the main domain.

What does "External rua destination may be unauthorized" mean?

When your rua= or ruf= email address belongs to a different domain than the one being protected, RFC 7489 requires the destination domain to publish a v=DMARC1 authorization TXT record at <your-domain>._report._dmarc.<destination-domain>. Without it, mail providers will refuse to send reports to that address.

Does Google / Yahoo require DMARC for bulk email senders?

Yes. Since February 2024, Google (Gmail) and Yahoo mandate that all bulk senders (5,000+ messages/day) publish a valid DMARC record (at minimum p=none) alongside aligned SPF and DKIM authentication.