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DNS Lookup, RFC 8484 DoH Inspector & SPF/DMARC Security Auditor

Query authoritative DNS resource records in real time via RFC 8484 DNS-over-HTTPS (Cloudflare 1.1.1.1 & Google 8.8.8.8) or server-side resolution. Audit SPF, DMARC, CAA certificate policies, IPv6 readiness, TTL propagation windows, and export BIND zone snippets.

Sample Domains:
📧 SPF Policy (TXT v=spf1)
✅ Detected
v=spf1 (~all / -all)
🛡️ DMARC (_dmarc TXT)
✅ p=reject
Anti-Spoofing Active
📬 MX Mail Redundancy
3 MX Servers
Failover Ready
🔐 CAA TLS Pinning
✅ Restricted
RFC 8659 CA Lock
🌐 IPv6 Dual-Stack (AAAA)
✅ 2 AAAA Recs
128-bit Routing Ready
⚡ Query Latency & Count
18 ms · 11 Recs
Cloudflare 1.1.1.1 DoH

Authoritative Resource Records for: cloudflare.com

Host / Name Type TTL (Cache Window) Record Data / Value (RDATA)
cloudflare.com A 300 s5m 0s 104.16.132.229
cloudflare.com A 300 s5m 0s 104.16.133.229
cloudflare.com AAAA 300 s5m 0s 2606:4700::6810:84e5
cloudflare.com MX 300 s5m 0s 10 mailstream-east.mxrecord.io.
cloudflare.com TXT 300 s5m 0s v=spf1 ip4:199.15.212.0/22 include:_spf.google.com ~all
_dmarc.cloudflare.com DMARC 300 s5m 0s v=DMARC1; p=reject; sp=reject; pct=100;
💻 Equivalent Terminal / UNIX dig Verification Commands:
dig @1.1.1.1 cloudflare.com A AAAA MX TXT NS CAA +noall +answer
dig @1.1.1.1 _dmarc.cloudflare.com TXT +short

DNS Resource Record Types (RFC 1035 / RFC 8484), Standard TTLs & Security Reference

Record Type & Code Defining IETF RFC Recommended TTL Technical Function & Syntax Example
A (Type 1) & AAAA (Type 28) RFC 1035 / RFC 3596 300 s – 3,600 s Maps hostname to 32-bit IPv4 (93.184.216.34) or 128-bit IPv6 (2606:2800:220:1::248) address
CNAME (Type 5) RFC 1035 3,600 s (1 hr) Canonical alias redirecting subdomain (www) to another hostname; cannot coexist at zone apex (@)
MX (Type 15) RFC 1035 / RFC 5321 3,600 s – 14,400 s Routes inbound SMTP email to mail servers ordered by 16-bit preference integer (lower = higher priority)
TXT (Type 16) — SPF & DMARC RFC 7208 / RFC 7489 300 s – 3,600 s Stores sender authentication policies (v=spf1, v=DMARC1; p=reject) and cryptographic DKIM public keys
NS (Type 2) & SOA (Type 6) RFC 1035 86,400 s (24 hr) Delegates authoritative zone servers and defines zone serial number, refresh, retry, and NXDOMAIN minimum TTL
CAA (Type 257) RFC 8659 3,600 s (1 hr) Restricts which Certificate Authorities (e.g., letsencrypt.org, digicert.com) may issue TLS/SSL certificates

How the RFC 8484 DoH DNS Inspector & Security Auditor Works

Every connection on the modern Internet begins with a Domain Name System (DNS) resolution. When an application connects to a hostname, it must translate human-readable domain labels into routable IPv4 or IPv6 addresses, discover inbound mail gateways, and verify cryptographic sender policies. Traditional web-based DNS tools rely on slow, single-threaded server reloads that cache stale records and expose only basic IP addresses.

Our DNS diagnostic workstation combines a real-time RFC 8484 DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) query engine with an SSRF-hardened server-side PHP fallback (dns_get_record) to inspect the complete zone hierarchy without reloading the page:

  • Multi-Resolver Verification (Cloudflare 1.1.1.1, Google 8.8.8.8 & Server OS): Switch between global Anycast DoH resolvers to verify whether new DNS changes have propagated across major recursive caches or are still held by a previous Time-To-Live (TTL) window.
  • Full Resource Record Coverage: Query individual record types or run a simultaneous ALL (Full Zone Scan) across A, AAAA, MX, TXT, NS, CNAME, SOA, CAA, SRV, PTR, and the dedicated _dmarc subdomain.
  • Automated Email Security & Zone Health Audit: The engine parses returned TXT, MX, and CAA payloads to verify whether the domain enforces Sender Policy Framework (v=spf1), DMARC anti-spoofing (p=reject or p=quarantine), multi-homing MX failover redundancy, and RFC 8659 CAA TLS certificate authority restrictions, while generating ready-to-run UNIX dig terminal commands and BIND zone exports.

From ARPANET’s HOSTS.TXT to Paul Mockapetris and RFC 1035 (1983)

During the early 1970s and early 1980s on the ARPANET, there was no distributed domain hierarchy. Every computer on the network resolved hostnames by downloading a single flat ASCII text file named HOSTS.TXT, maintained manually at the Stanford Research Institute (SRI) Network Information Center (NIC) by Elizabeth Feinler's team. System administrators had to email address updates to SRI and periodically download the updated master file over FTP.

As ARPANET grew past a thousand hosts, the centralized HOSTS.TXT architecture began collapsing under bandwidth congestion, naming collisions, and synchronization delays. In November 1983, computer scientist Paul Mockapetris (working alongside Jon Postel at USC's Information Sciences Institute) published RFC 882 and RFC 883—later codified in November 1987 as the foundational Internet standards RFC 1034 and RFC 1035.

Mockapetris replaced the centralized flat file with an inverted tree-structured, globally distributed database where authority is delegated downward from the root dot (.) to Top-Level Domains (.com, .org, country-code TLDs like .lt, .es, .tr) and finally to authoritative nameservers (`NS`) managed by individual domain owners. Crucially, each Resource Record (RR) carries a 32-bit unsigned integer TTL (Time-To-Live) in seconds, instructing recursive resolvers exactly how long they may cache the answer in RAM before re-querying the authoritative server.

Why There Are 13 Root Servers, UDP 512-Byte Limits, and Anycast BGP

One of the most famous technical questions in networking is why the entire global DNS hierarchy is anchored by exactly 13 logical Root Server letters (a.root-servers.net through m.root-servers.net). The answer lies in the strict packet geometry of 1983 networking hardware and RFC 1035 Section 2.3.4:

  • The 512-Byte UDP Payload Limit: Original DNS queries were designed to fit inside a single unfragmented 512-byte UDP datagram over port 53 (avoiding the minimum 576-byte IPv4 reassembly buffer limit of early routers). Using DNS label compression pointers, fitting the IPv4 glue addresses and names of root servers inside a single 512-byte priming response allowed a maximum of 13 root server entries (leaving ~90 bytes to spare).
  • BGP Anycast Multiplication: Today, "13 root servers" does not mean 13 physical machines. Through BGP (Border Gateway Protocol) Anycast routing, those 13 IPv4/IPv6 addresses are announced simultaneously by over 1,700 physical server clusters distributed across every inhabited continent, routing your query to the topologically nearest node in milliseconds.
  • EDNS0 (RFC 6891): Modern DNS extensions (EDNS0) negotiated an OPT pseudo-record allowing UDP payloads up to 1,232 or 4,096 bytes to accommodate large cryptographic DNSSEC (RFC 4033) RRSIG and DNSKEY signatures, falling back to TCP port 53 if the Truncated (TC=1) header flag is set.

RFC 8484 DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) and SPF/DMARC Email Security

Classic port 53 UDP/TCP DNS queries travel in unencrypted plaintext, allowing ISPs, public Wi-Fi operators, and on-path attackers to eavesdrop on every website a user visits or execute DNS cache poisoning and MITM spoofing. Standardized by the IETF in October 2018, RFC 8484 DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) encapsulates DNS wireformat and JSON queries inside encrypted TLS 1.3 HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 streams over port 443, authenticating the recursive resolver via X.509 certificates.

Equally critical is DNS's role as the cryptographic backbone of global email security. Because the 1982 Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) contains no built-in sender authentication, domain owners must publish three interlocking DNS records to prevent phishing and domain spoofing:

; 1. SPF (RFC 7208) - Authorizes outbound mail server IP ranges:
example.com.      300 IN TXT "v=spf1 ip4:198.51.100.0/24 include:_spf.google.com -all"

; 2. DMARC (RFC 7489) - Enforces alignment and instructs receivers to reject fakes:
_dmarc.example.com. 300 IN TXT "v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:[email protected]"

; 3. CAA (RFC 8659) - Locks which CAs can issue SSL/TLS certificates:
example.com.      3600 IN CAA 0 issue "letsencrypt.org"

FAQ (Frequently Asked Questions)

Why do Cloudflare (1.1.1.1) and Google (8.8.8.8) sometimes show different DNS records?

When you update a DNS record at your registrar, recursive resolvers around the world continue serving the previous cached record until its TTL (Time-To-Live, measured in seconds) expires. Querying both Cloudflare and Google DoH resolvers reveals whether your update has fully propagated.

What is the difference between an A record, AAAA record, and CNAME record?

An A record maps a hostname directly to a 32-bit IPv4 address (e.g., 104.16.132.229). An AAAA record maps a hostname to a 128-bit IPv6 address. A CNAME (Canonical Name) record creates an alias pointing one hostname to another hostname rather than an IP address.

Why can I not place a CNAME record on my root domain (Zone Apex @)?

According to RFC 1034 Section 3.6.2, if a node has a CNAME record, it cannot have any other resource record types. Because the root domain (@) must always hold SOA and NS records (and usually MX/TXT records), placing a standard CNAME at the apex violates the DNS protocol and breaks email delivery.

What is the difference between ~all (SoftFail) and -all (HardFail) in an SPF TXT record?

In an SPF record (v=spf1), -all (HardFail) instructs receiving mail servers to strictly reject any email sent from an IP address not listed in the record. ~all (SoftFail) marks unauthorized emails as suspicious/spam while allowing DMARC to make the final quarantine or rejection decision.

Why does this tool check _dmarc.domain.com separately when I run a scan?

Per RFC 7489, DMARC policies are never published on the root domain's TXT record; they must be published as a TXT record on the dedicated _dmarc subdomain (e.g., _dmarc.example.com). Our auditor automatically queries both the root zone and _dmarc subdomain.